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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE. STATE OF UTAH 
) 
) No. 14480 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit based on an Order to Show Cause why the res-
pondent should not be adjudged to have abandoned and deserted her 
minor children, Wendy Jo Robertson and Nicholas Ian Robertson, 
why the respondent's rights as the natural mother should not be 
extinguished, and why the Petition for Adoption of appellants 
should not be granted. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This being a proceeding in equity, the matter was heard be-
fore the Court sitting without a jury. The Court found that the 
respondent had not abandoned her children and ordered the appel-
lants1 Petition for Adoption dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have this Court find as a matter of 
law that the respondent abandoned her children, or failing that, 
to have the trial court's decision reversed and this case remand-
ed for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Nicholas Robertson, and respondent, Judith Ann 
Hutchison, were married June 30, 1965, in Springville, Utah. (R. 
30} Two children were born as issue of that marriage, one girl, 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF WENDY JO 
ROBERTSON AND NICHOLAS 
IAN ROBERTSON. 
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Wendy Jo Robertson, born February 3, 1966, and one boy, Nicholas 
Ian Robertson, born April 11, 1968- (R. 30) In the fall, of 
1970, the respondent left Springville to go to Louisville for 
the stated purpose of visiting her parents. (T. 51, 15) Once in 
Kentucky, she refused to return to her home in Utah. (T. 51) The 
appellant, Mr. Robertson, became concerned about his wife and the 
welfare of his children, and went to Indiana to try to locate them. 
(T. 51,54) Upon locating them, he brought the children back to 
their home in Utah. The respondent, however, declined to accom-
pany them. (T. 5, R. 30) 
After returning home, Mr. Robertson made repeated efforts 
to contact his wife and locate her whereabouts, but was unable 
to do so. (T. 54, 55) Although her parents knew her place of 
residence, and were in frequent contact with her, they refused to 
give him any information that would enable him to establish con-
tact with her. (T. 54,23) Since appellant lived with his child-
ren in the same house he had occupied with the respondent, she 
could have contacted him or the children anytime she so desired. 
(T. 16, 55) She made no effort to do so. (T. 15, 16) 
Having made many futile attempts to contact her, and she 
having made no attempt to contact him, appellant commenced an 
action for divorce. (T. 5 4) Copies of the complaint and summons 
were sent by registered mail to the respondent at her parents' 
home. She did not respond to the summons nor did she make an 
appearance in court and a decree of divorce by default was obtain-
ed by the appellant awarding him custody of Wendy and Ian. (R. 
Ex. 1) Even at the time of the divorce proceeding, it was Mr. 
Robertson's desire to reconcile with the respondent. (T. 57) He 
•• ~ 2 - '"' 
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had no desire to deprive his wife of visitation rights, and, in 
fact, provided for visitation rights in the divorce decree against 
the advice of his attorney. (T. 57) A copy of the decree and all 
other pertinent papers were sent to the respondent at her parents1 
address. (T. 57) She did not respond nor make any contact with 
Mr. Robertson or the children. (T. 57, 58). 
On August 15, 1971, Mr. Robertson married his present wife, 
Patricia Robertson. (T. 52) Nicholas and Patricia Robertson 
currently reside in Provo, Utah with Wendy and Ian and two other 
minor children. (T. 52) Wendy is now 10 years of age. Since the 
age of 5, she has lived continuously with the appellant, Patricia 
Robertson. She has not seen nor heard from the respondent since 
age 4. (T. 20) Ian is now 8 years of age and had lived contin-
uously with Patricia Robertson since age 3. He has not seen nor-
heard from the respondent since age 2. (T. 20) A strong bond 
of love has developed between Patricia and Wendy and Ian, and 
the children look to Patricia as their mother. (T. 54) Respon-
dent stipulated to the strong bonds of love and family ties that 
have developed. (T. 54) 
On July 11, 1975, the appellants petitioned for the adop-
tion of Wendy Jo Robertson and Nicholas Ian Robertson by the ap-
pellant, Patricia M. Robertson. (R. 71-74) The Court issued an 
Order to'Show Cause why the respondent should not be adjudged to 
have deserted and abandoned her minor children, Wendy Jo and 
Nicholas Ian Robertson, and why the petition for adoption should 
not be granted. (R. 64,65) 
In all of the time from September of 1970 to July of 1975, 
a period of nearly five years, the respondent made no attempt to 
-^- . 
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see or contact, directly or indirectly, either Wendy or Ian. (R. 
31) She sent them no letters, cards, birthday or Christmas pres-
ents; she did not even attempt a telephone call. (R. 31, T. 15, 
39) It was not until July of 1975, that the respondent made any 
attempt to contact the children. (T. 16) 
On March 30, 19 71, the respondent was involved in a motor-
cycle accident. (T. 33) Her medical records indicate that she 
was hospitalized from that date until May 8, 1971, a period of 
some five weeks. (R. 30) The record also shows that she sus-
tained several injuries, and these injuries caused her, from time 
to time, to return to the hospital for further treatment. (R. 
Ex. 2) She contends these injuries kept her from communicating 
with the children. (T. 36, R. 31) Nevertheless, Mrs. Hutchison 
admits that since the accident she has been able to maintain con-
tact with her parents by phone and letters.. She has been able 
to successfully work at several jobs, including waitress, sales 
clerk, lay-out and paste-up artist for a publishing company, 
personnel manager of a small store, and even managed some farm 
property. (T. 16, 17) She also admits that she has not been 
prevented from changing domiciles with great frequency. Her 
testimony shows that she lived in the towns of New Albany, Vivay 
and Jeffersonville, in the State of Indiana, between the time of 
the accident and her remarriage in November of 1972, a period of 
some 18 months. (T. 5, 6, 7) Her medical bills also show bill-
ing statements sent to her in Lansing, Michigan and an additional 
address in Jeffersonville, Indiana. (R. Ex. 2) 
Mrs. Hutchison also testified that she felt it was in the 
best interests of the children to not to attempt to communicate 
with them. (T. 43) 
- 4 ~ 
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At the trial the appellant attempted to introduce oral evi-
dence to show that the respondent abandoned her children in Sep-
tember, 1970. (T. 9) The respondent objected to the introduc-
tion of all evidence of abandonment prior to April 13, 1971, the 
date of the divorce decree, on the grounds that such evidence 
was immaterial to the issue before the Court. (T. 9) The ap-
pellant assured the Court that the evidence was indeed material, 
and that the evidence would show the respondent's intent, motive, 
proclivities and attitudes with respect to the issue of abandon-
ment, in addition to showing respondent's abandonment preceded the 
date of the divorce decree. (T. 10) On the basis of the respon-
dent's objection, the Court ruled that appellants would not be 
allowed to go into events and circumstances that preceded the 
divorce decree. (T. 9, 12) The record clearly shows that the rul-
ing was based on immateriality. (T. 9, R. 32) In response to 
the Court1s adverse ruling, the appellant made several offers of 
proof to further establish the materiality of the excluded evi-
dence and preserve his record for appeal. (T. 11, 12, 45-51) 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD NOT ABANDONED 
HER MINOR CHILDREN. 
A. ADOPTION IS A PROCEEDING IN EQUITY. 
An adoption proceeding is equitable in nature. In Re Adop-
tion of.p, 122 Utah 528, 252 P.2d 223 (1953); Walton v. Koffman, 
110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946). Thus, upon appeal, this Court 
has authority to review the facts, and may determine the weight 
of the evidence. Utah Const. Art.VIII, §9; Crockett y. Nish, 
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106 Utah 241, 147 P.2d 853 (1944); Nokes v. Continental Mining & 
Mil.ling Co. , 6 Utah2d 177, 308 P.2d 954 (1954); Cannon v. Heuber-
ger, 1 Utah2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 '(1954). In Nokes v. Continental 
Mining & Milling Co., supra, this Court took the opportunity to 
carefully outline the standards and considerations that would 
obtain in the review of equity decisions. It is quite clear 
from Nokes that in the review of an equity proceeding, the deci-
sion of a trial judge will be upheld unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against it. The case law preceding Nokes and sub-
sequent to it clearly articulates the same standard. It is 
equally clear that if the evidence does clearly preponderate 
against the trial court's decision, this Court has authority to 
reverse such a decision and will do so. Randall v. Tracy Collins 
Trust Co,, 6 Utah2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956). 
The reason for giving careful consideration to the trial 
court's findings rests in the trial court's unique position to 
observe the witnesses as they testify, for it is true that the 
appearance, behavior and general demeanor of a witness is often 
the key to the veracity of his testimony. Nokes, supra. Thus, 
when the evidence is conflicting but preponderates in favor of 
the findings, or even if the evidence is evenly balanced, the 
finding below will not usually be overturned. By the same logic, 
it is clear that when the evidence is mostly testimony, and is 
weighted slightly against the trial court's findings, the find-
ings should not ordinarily be overturned. Again, this is by rea-
son of the the trial court's peculiar position enabling it to 
analyze and evaluate the testimony as it is offered. There are 
occasions, however, when the reviewing court is equally as well-
• - 6 - , 
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placed as a trial court with respect to being able to determine 
the weight and credibility of the evidence adduced in trial. As 
the Court points out in Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 
P.2d 194, (1949): 
There are cases in which we may be in 
equally as good a position as a trial court 
to make inferences from what are called 
basic, evidentiary and underlying facts. 
For instance where the evidence is all docu-
mentary. . .; also where there are circum-
stances attending the evidence which mark it 
definitely for one side or the other in res-
pect to which circumstances the question of 
credibility of witnesses would play no part; 
or all the evidence is preserved in physical 
form and there are no issues concerning it 
in which the credibility of witnesses could 
play a part. In the cases just mentioned and 
in some others perhaps which might be thought 
of we would seemingly be in as.good a position 
as the trial court to make inferences and de-
ductions from the evidence. (emphasis added) 
The instant case is one in which the appellate court is in 
as advantageous a position as was the trial court to judge the 
evidence. This is true for several reasons. First, there is 
actually very little evidence in this case. The trial court's 
ruling excluding all of the appellantfs evidence relating to 
events prior to the divorce decree left very little for the 
appellant to present, other than the fact that the respondent 
had not seen or contacted appellant or the children in nearly 
five years. The rest of appellant's case consisted of offers 
of proof made in response to the trial court's ruling. These 
proffers are not evidence per se to be weighed by this Court, 
this Court only needs to determine whether these proffers were 
material to the question of abandonment or desertion. 
Second, the respondent has stipulated and admitted to several 
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of the key facts which tend to show abandonment. For examplef 
the respondent admitted that she had not seen or contacted the 
children from September of 1970 to July of 1975. (T. 15, 16) 
Respondent also admits that she made no attempt to see or contact them. 
Respondent further admits that she refused to accompany her child-
ren from Kentucky to their home in Springville, Utah, and that since 
that time she has never even inquired of anybody as to their present 
status or welfare. (T. 19, R. 30) 
Finally, respondent's testimony as to the reasons for not at-
tempting to see or contact the children during the five-year period 
are totally lacking in credibility, and are contradicted by her 
own testimony and exhibits. Respondent's admission to facts 
damaging to her case and her self-contradictory testimony and 
exhibits will be fully examined hereafter, and are mentioned 
here only to establish this case as one in which the Court is 
in equally as good a position as the trial court to pass upon 
the evidence, 
B. THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
AGAINST THE TRIAL COURTfS FINDINGS. 
The evidence in this case clearly preponderates against 
the trial court's finding. Indeed the only real evidence respondent 
produced at trial were bare asserstions that she was physically and 
emotionally incapable of communicating with the children, and 
some medical records which fail to support her claims. In light 
of respondent's admissions, stipulations and testimony regarding 
her activity during the period in question, it would tax the 
credulity of a saint to believe her supportive contentions. 
-8-
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The record is clear that respondent made no efforts to see 
or•communicate with her children for a period of five years* 
She admitted that she did not even make any inquiries about them, 
and that the only information she ever had was what she just 
happened to hear. (T. 19). The respondent's explanation for 
her apparent total disregard for her children is that on March 
30, 19 71, she was involved in a motorcycle accident which caused 
her physical and emotional injuries. These injuries, she con-
tends, prevented her from communicating with her children as 
she desired. 
The appellant does not question the fact of respondent's 
unfortunate accident which regretably caused her some serious 
injuries, yet it is difficult to believe that the type of injuries 
she suffered would prevent a mother who was genuinely interested 
in the welfare of her children from attempting to see or contact 
them for a period of five years. In the instant case, in light 
of the numerous and varied activities in which the respondent 
engaged herself soon after the accident, and in which she engaged 
up through July of 1975, it is disconcerting to be asked to believe 
that the respondent was so physically and emotionally handicapped 
that she could not communicate with her children nor concern 
herself with their welfare had she any desire to do so. Such 
testimony is not a believable defense to the charge of abandonment. 
The first weakness inherent in this defense is that it does 
not explain why the respondent refused to accompany her children 
back home in December of 19 70, nor does it explain why the respondent 
made no effort to see or contact the children from that time until 
the time of the accident. Respondent was apparently in good health 
- Q -
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during that period of seven months. It should be pointed out 
that her daughter, Wendy, had a birthday in February of that 
year and respondent did not bother to remember her on that day. 
One is compelled to ask why she made no attempt to see or contact 
her children during that period of time. The Court's ruling 
that evidence prior to the date of the divorce decree was immaterial 
prevented the appellant from going into this period of time. 
However, the respondent's own testimony shows that she declined 
to return home with the children in September of 1970 and that 
she made no attempt to contact her children during that period. 
In spite of respondent's claim that physical injuries pre-
vented her from communicating with her children, respondent was 
able to hold various jobs which required communicative and physical 
abilities. Respondent worked as a personnel manager of ci small 
business, as a graphic arts designer, and as a lay-out and paste-
up artist. She also worked as a sales clerk, as a waitress, and 
she even managed some farm property in Indiana. It is incredible 
to believe that she could perform these functions and duties 
without being able to write memos, notes, letters, and speak 
on the telephone, yet she never sent a letter or a card to her 
children, she never called them on the phone, never sent them 
a birthday or Christmas card or gift,. She did send letters to 
her parents and communicated with them all during this period. 
(T. 39) 
Respondent's claims that her physical disability prevent-
ed or made difficult any attempts to communicate with her child-
ren are further refuted by her rather transcient existence during 
the period following the agcident. Respondent had many different 
v -10-
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domiciles during this period, including residences in New Albany 
and Jeffersonville, Indiana; Vavay, Indiana; Lansing, Michigan; 
and others. Her medical billing statements which she introduced 
as respondent's Exhibit #2 also indicate that she resided at 
many different addresses during this period. These billing state-
ments and her own testimony show that she was indeed physically 
well enough to set up housekeeping, move/and re-establish herself 
many times during the period in question. It is inconsistent 
with everyday experience for a person to be capable of the types 
of activities necessary to accomplish such physical tasks and 
not be able to write a letter or make a phone call. 
A final fact that refutes respondent's claim that her physical 
and emotional condition made it difficult for her to communicate 
with her children is the fact that by the fall of 1971, just 
a few r.onths after being discharged from the hospital, the respon-
dent had become involved in a courtship which lasted about one . 
year and resulted in her marriage to her present husband. Again, 
it is difficult to contemplate conditions such that one is mentally 
and physically strong enough to be involved in a courtship and 
marriage and not be able to use ordinary methods of communication 
to establish contact with one's children and to inquire as to 
their well-being and needs. 
In summary, all of the above facts considered together clearly 
preponderate against the findings and decision of the trial court. 
All of the above facts came from her own testimony and admissions. 
It is clearly seen from these facts that she could have concerned 
herself with the status and welfare of her children had she been 
the least bit so inclined. Her only rebuttal consists of medical Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reports which show that she was hospitalized for eight weeks in 
19 71 and her own statements that she was physically hapmered and 
mentally confused. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING, ON THE BASIS OF IMMATERIALITY, 
EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENTS ABANDONMENT PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE DECREE 
OF DIVORCE, AND SUCH ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
A. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE EVIDENCE AS IMMATERIAL. 
In the instant case, the sole issue to be decided is whether 
the respondent has abandoned her two minor children. The facts 
show that the respondent had not attempted to see or communicate 
directly or indirectly with her children from September of 1970 to 
July of 1975. The issue of abandonment covers this entire period, 
and any evidence relating to the time period, or which could help 
to explain the events of this time period that would tend to prove 
or disprove abandonment, would be material. 
The question as to whether evidence is "material1' or "immaterial" 
depends upon whether the evidence relates to a matter in issue in 
the case. McCormjck on Evidence, 2nd Ed., p. 434. If the evidence 
relates to something in issue, it is material. Conversely, 
"immateriality" denotes evidence which is offered to prove or dis-
prove a fact or proposition which is not in issue. 29 Am.Jur.2d, 
Evidence, § 252. Thus, it is said that if evidence is "offered 
to prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue or probative 
of a matter in issue, the evidence is properly said to be immaterial". 
McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Ed., p. 434. ' 
In actual practice, the terms "materiality" and "relevancy" 
are often used interchangeably, and quite frequently, relevancy is Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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said to include the requirement of materiality. Materiality 
and relevancy, taken together, form the most elementary rule of 
evidence: matters offered in evidence must be relevant to the 
issues and tend to establish or disprove them. 29 Am.Jur.2d, 
Evidence, § 2 52. Conversely, unless excluded by some specific 
rule of exclusion (i.e. Hearsay Rule, Best Evidence Rule, etc.), 
all evidence of facts and circumstances tending to prove or dis-
prove any proposition which is in issue is properly admissible 
and such evidence must not be excluded. Foster v. Keating, 120 
C.A.2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953); Bole v. Bole, 76 C.A.2d 344, 172 
P.2d 936, (1946); Berkshire v. Harem, 181 Or. 42, 178 P.2d 133, 
(1947); Keen.ey v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 389, 454 P.2d 
456, (1969) . • 
The Court's ruling, based as it is on immateriality, is clearly 
erroneous. The issue before the Court is abandonment. All evidence 
pertaining to that issue is material, whether relating to events 
prior to the decree of divorce or subsequent to it. This is es-
pecially true when as in this case, the time period covered by 
respondent's apparent abandonment is one continuous period, in-
cluding time both before and after the decree. Thus, as long as 
the evidence related to the issue of abandonment and has probative 
value, i.e., tends to prove or disprove the matter in issue, it is 
admissible unless the evidence must be excluded on some other 
grounds, Keeney v. City of Overland Park, supra. The respondent 
urges no other grounds, nor did the court speak to any other grounds, 
as the basis of its ruling. Thus, the appellant was deprived of 
his right to put forth all of his relevant evidence material to 
the issue of abandonment. Foster v. Keating, supra; Bole v. Bole, 
-13-
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supra, 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The general rule is that when an exception is made to a ruling 
excluding evidence, that exception must be based on an actual 
offer of proof. Rasmussen v. Davis, 1 Utah2d 96, 262 P.2d 488, 
(1953); Dansak v. Deluke, 12 Utah2d 302, 366 P.2d 67, (1961). 
See also 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 12 8. 
At the time of the respondents objection, the appellant made 
several offers of proof showing that the facts and events he 
would prove, if allowed, were clearly material to the issue of 
abandonment. These proffers cover several pages of the transcript, 
(see T. 11, 12, 46-50). The offers of proof included the following: 
1. While appellant and respondent were married and living as 
husband and wife in Ventura, California, the respondent became 
attracted to a hippy-type element. 
2. Partially as a result of respondent's spending increasing 
amounts of time with her hippy friends, both male and female, 
appellant and respondent moved back to Springville, Utah. 
".-•..- •'.'• 3. After returning to Springville, the respondent associated 
herself with the hippy element there, was involved with drugs and 
other men. 
4. In the fall of 1972, she went to Louisville, Kentucky to 
visit her parents and to hopefully straighten herself out. The 
children accompanied her on this visit. 
5. At the end of the visit, instead of returning home, she 
rented an apartment v/ith some friends, without the knowledge of 
her parents or her husband. She used the money that her husband 
had sent as airfare for her and the children's return home. 
. -14-
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6. Respondent refused to tell appellant where she was living, 
but with the help of the police, he located her and flew back to 
see if he could persuade her to come home. 
7. When the appellant arrived at the apartment where the re-
spondent was living, it was quite late. Very loud music was playing 
inside. The appellant found the respondent inside; she was scantily 
attired. There were many other people inside, male and female, who 
were in various states of dress and undress and engaged in various 
activities. 
8. He found his children in a back room, naked, lying on a mat-
tress, and covered in their own excrement. The boys face was swol-
len with bug bites. 
9. Appellant had to do physical combat with respondents male 
friends to retrieve his children and leave the apartment. The police 
arrested respondent but released her to his custody if she would 
return home with him. 
10. Her hippy friends accompanied her to the airport, she hugged 
and kissed them good-bye, and was very openly affectionate with one 
particular male companion. She stated that she would do anything 
necessary to keep from returning home with appellant and the 
children. She claimed that she would blow up the plane, kill him 
and the children if she had to. He let her stay behind. From that 
time in September of 1970 until July of 1975, shortly before this 
petition v/as formally commenced, respondent never attempted to see 
or contact in any manner her children. 
11. When Wendy Jo, who was then four, began to realize that 
her mother probably was not going to ever come home, she became 
very v/ithdrav/n and psychotic, and concluded in her own mind that 
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that her mother had abandoned her. 
The above events and circumstances, had they not been excluded 
by the Court's ruling, clearly indicate the respondent's intent to 
desert and abandon her children. Such evidence certainly is mat-
erial to the issue of abandonment and desertion. Even though a strong 
case for abandonment can be made solely on the basis of the facts 
appearing since the decree of divorce, when the events and cir-
cumstances subsequent to the decree are examined in light of the 
events prior to the decree, a vivid picture of abandonment is pre-
sented. Exclusion of such evidence substantially denied the appel-
land his right to submit all relevant and material evidence showing 
abandonment, and such error was manifestly prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence at the trial clearly 
demonstrated the respondent's abandonment of her children. Had not 
< 
the trial court erred in prohibiting the appellants from going into events 
and circumstances material to the issue of abandonment, but which 
preceeded the date of the divorce decree, the respondent's abandon-
ment would have been vividly clear. The appellants, therefore, 
respectfully urge this Court to reverse the trial court's decision 
and find as a matter of law that the respondent abandoned her children, 
or in the alternative, to reverse the trial court's decision and 
remand for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this j£j£z_ day of June, 1976. 
Jj&d^j^f&rtJ &*,<!* z 
xSONRGVJARD, f or: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN * 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Petitioners-Appellants 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner-Appellants 
to Cullen Y. Christensen, Attorney for Respondent, 55 East Center 
Street, Provo, Utah 84601, this 'Z2- d a y o f J u n e' 1976-
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